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During the period of rapid deterioration of relations among the World War II 
allies in the years immediately after the war, the possibility of military 
confrontation between the United States (US) and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR) m Europe seemed extremely high In fact, the 
conflict m interests and policies in Eastern Europe between the two emerging 
superpowers resulted m the Cold War The extension, largely through 
coercion, of Soviet-style political systems directly dominated by the USSR, 
was viewed by American leaders as but a prelude to Soviet efforts to extend 
their control over Western Europe By 1948, with the coup that imposed a 
communist regime in Czechoslovakia, a rough line from North to South 
divided the emerging Soviet- and US-oriented political-military blocs in 
Europe, the Soviets had closed all surface access to West Berlin, and loud and 
influential voices in the United States were calling for dramatic military 
rearmament to meet the menace of Soviet imperialism in Europe
US leaders had already determined that the future of Europe was of 
vital concern to long-term US interests Through both the Truman Doctrine 
enunciated in March 1947 and the Marshall Plan of June 1947 the US political 
leaders committed the nation to stemming what was viewed as the challenge 
to European, and US, interests emanating from Moscow The establishment 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, though it did not 
yet bring with it significant changes in the actual military situation, 
represented the culmination of the process of reorientation of traditional US 
isolationist policy vis-à-vis Europe, toward a policy of commitment and 
involvement
Most Western analysts would agree that the conflict between the 
United States and the Soviet Union over competing interests and objectives 
m East-Central Europe m the late 1940s resulted m a higher probability of 
direct military confrontation between the two countries than at any other 
time in the ensuing four decades, with the exception of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis of 1962 Today, however, among the various regions of the world it is 
precisely in Europe that the outbreak of military hostilities and a direct 
military confrontation between the two superpowers is least likely
The purpose of the present essay will be to examine those factors which 
resulted in the establishment m Europe, already by the late 1950s, of a security 
regime consisting of two political-military blocs Both sides accepted this 
regime and merely reduced the likelihood of military conflict, despite 
(arguably because of) the physical presence of the largest military stockpiles of 
conventional and nuclear weapons ever assembled in one area Although 
much rhetorical posturing and periodic increases m political tensions have 
occurred, this security regime brought peace and substantial political stability 
to Europe over the past forty years Even prior to the recent "outbreak of 
peace", the threat of war no longer played the role of a political instrument in 
Europe, as it had in the past The essential elements m dispute between the
2two blocs have concerned the very existence and nature of the security 
system, not, primarily, issues of territory or resources Until the 
revolutionary developments of late 1989, all were seemingly agreed that any 
effort to undermine or dismantle that system could result in a confrontation 
disastrous for all concerned1
To put the issue of the "cooperative" aspect of superpower relations in 
Europe within the theoretical framework of this study, it is crucial to note the 
essentially conflictual nature of US-Soviet interests in Europe As will be 
developed m more detail below, the policy preferences of the two 
superpowers for Europe as a whole and for its two parts have been almost 
diametrically opposed Yet, since at least the 1950s, each side has recognized 
the dangers inherent in a pursuit of its objectives in Europe that would 
directly challenge the position of the other side What evolved was a system 
that included partial convergence of interests and objectives of limited scope 
Though some cooperative arrangements that contribute to the stability of the 
European security regime are explicit and the result of overt bargaining (as m 
the agreements concerning Austria in 1955 and in the 1971 agreements over 
the status of Berlin), others are tacit in nature and are based on parallel 
actions or even non-actions of the superpowers Most recently the unilateral 
statements concerning the reduction of military commitments in Central 
Europe and the ongoing negotiations on conventional forces in Europe give 
promise of possible major breakthroughs in superpower cooperation in 
reducing the likelihood of their coming into conflict m the area
The present essay focuses on the competitive-cooperative relationship 
between the superpowers in Eastern Europe and is divided into four major 
sections The first examines the nature of the interests of both the Soviet 
Union and the United States m Eastern Europe The second part traces the 
evolution of the Eastern European security regime Special attention is given 
to the evidence of superpower "cooperative" arrangements as they evolved 
over the course of the past forty years The third part of the paper delineates 
the specific nature of the European security system and the rules of behavior 
(or operational code") that emerged during that period The discussion 
responds to the question, to what extent has "cooperation" become an 
operative element in Soviet-Amencan relations as they relate to Eastern 
Europe The final section of the essay outlines the reasons for the recent 
revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe and the prospects for the expansion 
and strengthening of superpower cooperation concerning Eastern Europe
Superpower Interests m Eastern Europe
The years immediately after World War n witnessed a dramatic collapse of 
relations among the wartime allies, as the Soviet Union proceeded to 
establish political dependencies m the areas under its military control m east-
3central Europe Other authors have provided extensive documentation of 
the process which resulted, by 1948, m Stalin s successfully sealing off the 
area from both the military power and the effective political influence of the 
West and creating the foundations for communist rule and Soviet 
dominance 2 What is important here is an understanding of the key 
objectives of the Soviet leadership in the late 1940s and of the ways in which 
these objectives were at odds with US goals In other words, what role did 
Eastern Europe play in the origins of the Cold War and superpower global 
conflict7
Soviet policy objectives in Eastern Europe emerged only gradually 
during the the war Even in the immediate postwar period Stalin s views 
concerning the nature of a future Eastern Europe had not coalesced 
completely 3 As Stalin sensed the inability or unwillingness of the United 
States and Great Britain to oppose, effectively, his initiatives in the region, he 
pushed to incorporate Eastern Europe into the Soviet empire The charges of 
revisionist historians notwithstanding, it is important to note that the 
evidence indicates only minimal US efforts, beyond diplomatic complaints, to 
intervene m Eastern Europe to influence political developments As the 
Soviets and their Eastern European communist clients imprisoned or 
executed non-communist political leaders, the United States stood by, 
seemingly paralyzed In fact, diplomats stationed in the Eastern European 
capitals were regularly instructed to avoid confrontation with Soviet officials 
In Romania in 1944-45, for example, US representatives were precluded from 
meeting with local politicians, lest this might result in conflict with the 
Soviets 4
By 1948 Stalin s objectives m Eastern Europe had been clarified and 
implemented They set the framework for Soviet policy in the region for the 
next four decades during which the Soviet leadership treated Eastern Europe 
largely as an extension of the Soviet domestic system—as a virtual fiefdom 
under Stalin or as a junior partner during the Brezhnev years 5 Briefly, the 
Soviets viewed Eastern Europe from several, not necessarily mutually 
compatible, perspectives
As a defensive bulwark In this sense Eastern Europe served as a buffer 
zone against possible attack from the West, as a zone of forward 
deployment of Soviet forces, and as a contributor to the overall defense 
effort of the region In the ideological realm, Eastern Europe was also seen 
as a bulwark against the incursion of Western liberalism into the USSR 
In fact, changes in the nature of warfare since the 1940s have reduced the 
military security value of the region, and Eastern Europe has acted more as 
a conduit of Western ideas than as a barrier or filter, even prior to recent 
political developments
4As a basts for an offensive strategy This springboard conception, the 
reciprocal of the first factor, had three major aspects
Ideological Eastern Europe was viewed as the advance guard of the 
world communist movement and, along with the USSR itself, the 
spearhead of the global communist revolution
Political Eastern Europe has served as a base for policy initiatives, e g 
peace campaigns designed to influence Western Europe and split the 
contment from the Umted States During the 1970s several East 
European states also became important partners of the USSR in the 
pursuit of global objectives, especially in the Third World
Military Eastern Europe served as a forward base for possible military 
initiatives taken against the West, this logistical contribution was 
especially important for both the German Democratic Republic (GDR) 
and Poland
As the nucleus of an international bloc of support in world politics 
Though this Eastern European role has been important ever since Stalin, 
it was especially emphasized during the 1970s, when the Soviets spoke 
enthusiastically of the changing international correlation of forces and the 
important role of other socialist states in world affairs
As a source of ideological and political legitimization Though there 
have been changes over time Soviet leaders have seemingly been 
convinced that the existence of a bloc of states modelled after the USSR 
and publicly pursuing similar policies is essential to the political 
legitimacy of the Soviet system
As an economic asset Initially, through reparations and other 
exploitative arrangements, Eastern Europe served as a source of capital 
and technology for the USSR Throughout the 1950s and 1960s barter 
arrangements brought Eastern European industrial and consumer goods 
to the USSR in return for raw materials More recently, however, the 
economic benefit of Eastern Europe for the Soviets has become 
questionable, economic relations with most countries have resulted in a 
net transfer of Soviet resources
The relative importance of these factors has changed over the course of 
the past forty years Ultimately, what the Soviet leadership has sought in 
Eastern Europe until very recently was a bloc of prosperous, single-party states 
organically tied to the USSR m such a way as to be fully supportive of all 
Soviet policy initiatives The key problem faced by those leaders in achieving 
this objective has resulted from the basic tension or incompatibility between 
two essential elements of that vision—the viability of Eastern European
5regimes and the cohesion of the Soviet-centered European communist 
system
Virtually all of the political crises in Eastern Europe over the past forty 
years—including the current one that is leading to the demise of communist 
systems—resulted precisely from this tension In so far as East European 
leaders pursued policies consonant with Soviet interests, they generally did 
not respond to popular demands for national identity, expanded political 
participation, and improved standards of living, as in the GDR and Hungary 
m the 1950s On the other hand, when leaders responded to the popular will 
in an effort to generate greater domestic legitimacy and viability, they found 
themselves in conflict with the Soviet concern about bloc unity and 
adherence to the traditional Soviet conception of socialist internationalism— 
e g , in Czechoslovakia m 1968, and Poland m 1956 and again in 1980-81 For 
the Soviet leadership from Stalin to Chernenko, the ultimate touchstone m 
evaluating its relations with Eastern Europe was Moscow s ability to 
dominate the area and to control key developments It was precisely this 
aspect of Soviet policy, along with the role that the region played in the 
military balance, that brought it into conflict with the United States
It is a bit more difficult to outline the major interests of the Umted 
States m Eastern Europe m the postwar era, since they have never been so 
clearly developed For the most part these interests were initially defined 
primarily m terms of the emerging conflict with the Soviet Union m the 
region Moreover, over the course of the past forty years the US response to 
Soviet domination of Eastern Europe has varied, depending upon the nature 
of US-Soviet relations at any given time During the generally rare periods of 
detente m superpower relations, the United States has tended to accept—at 
least not directly challenge—the Soviet sphere of influence m the region At 
times of heightened tension, however, US policy has tended to treat the 
Eastern Europeans as mere extensions of the USSR, fit to suffer the penalties 
inherent m trade restrictions and coercive policies Yet, throughout most of 
the past forty years, beginning with the Soviet-Yugoslav split, the general 
objective of US policy in Eastern Europe has been to stimulate and support 
diversity and political autonomy within the Soviet bloc, to implement a 
policy that might be termed reverse Finlandization As Sarah Terry has put 
the issue "in the periods of 'competitive coexistence' that have dominated 
the post-Stalm era, Washington has sought to encourage both domestic 
liberalization within the various East European countries and greater foreign 
policy 'differentiation '"6
Already at the height of the cold war in 1949, the National Security 
Council advised President Truman that the most realistic objective for the 
United States was to encourage the creation of regimes in the region that were 
free of Soviet domination, rather than pro-Western Rhetoric during the 
1952 presidential campaign concerning the immorality of containment and
6the need to 'roll back the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe notwithstanding, 
US policy during the Eisenhower administration pursued much more 
modest objectives diversity within the Soviet bloc rather than liberation and 
liberalization in domestic politics rather than full-scale democracy 7 In effect, 
it was in the 1950s that the foundations for future US policy in Eastern Europe 
were firmly established US objectives were limited to modest support for 
marginal change m the region, for they were based on the realization that the 
USSR viewed the region as a vital concern and that the United States was not 
in a position to provide active support for those who wanted major change— 
unless it was prepared to face a major military confrontation with the Soviet 
Union
Although there has been essential continuity in the pursuit of limited 
goals by Washington since the Truman administration, long-term objectives are 
often expressed in maximal terms This results in periodic incompatibility 
between stated principles and the reality of US policy Never was that 
contradiction more clear than at the time of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 
The rhetoric of the 1952 presidential campaign and the propaganda lines of Radio 
Free Europe led many m Hungary to expect US support, yet, the strategic and 
geopolitical realities of east-central Europe meant that US support for the 
Hungarians was limited to public rhetoric and resettlement assistance
Over the past four decades US interests m Eastern Europe, though real 
and significant have been largely derivative and secondary The primary 
objective m US policy, regardless of region of the world, has been the 
limitation of the risk of nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union 
Another policy objective of great importance has been containment of Soviet 
control and influence in Europe and elsewhere m the world Within Europe 
the United States has been committed to maintaining the unity of the 
Western alliance system as a key element in containing Soviet expansionism 
It is within the context of these policy objectives that US interests in Eastern 
Europe must be understood In so far as Eastern Europe was perceived as a 
supporter of and adjunct to Soviet expansiomst tendencies, US policy toward 
the region differed little from that toward the USSR itself However, Eastern 
Europe was also viewed as a weak link in the defense chain of the Soviet 
Union and, thus, a potential target of US initiatives However, given the 
level of Soviet concern about and commitment to the maintenance of its 
dominant position in the region, the US was forced to pursue a policy of 
"peaceful engagement," to use the term coined by Zbigniew Brzezinski and 
William Griffith 8 This policy meant that rivalry with the USSR in Eastern 
Europe would continue, but within circumscribed boundaries and by limited 
means As will be discussed further below, the revolutionary changes that 
have affected Eastern Europe since 1989 have resulted in a new relationship 
between the superpowers, which diverges from past patterns
7Eastern Europe and the Emergence of 
a New European Security Regime
After this brief examination of the interests of the two superpowers in Eastern 
Europe, we turn to a survey of major elements of superpower policy m 
relationship to Eastern Europe Specifically, we shall examine those aspects of 
policy that can be termed "cooperative and that contributed to the emergence 
of the stable European security regime which characterized interstate relations 
after the late 1950s
Nowhere was the conflict between the United States and the Soviet 
Union more pronounced in the years from 1945 until 1950 than in Central 
Europe By 1947, the Truman administration concluded that little hope 
existed of cooperation with the Soviets to solve key issues such as "the 
German question," the civil war in Greece, and concerns about democracy in 
the East European states The Truman Doctrine of 1947 served as the 
foundation for a new US policy of containing Soviet expansion and 
influence, while the Marshall Plan promised the economic rehabilitation of 
European countries associated with the United States
The Soviets viewed this new US policy as a direct and immediate 
challenge to its postwar position in central Eastern Europe At the founding 
meeting of the Commform in September 1947, Andrei Zhdanov, the second- 
in-command to Stalin, proclaimed his ' two-camp' thesis and asserted that 
US policy was committed to the enslavement of Europe and the unleashing 
of a new war against the Soviet Union 9 From the Soviet perspective, US 
policy posed a potential challenge to Soviet objectives This required an 
adjustment of Soviet policies, especially in Eastern Europe, where Stalin 
accelerated the consolidation of communist regimes, as well as the extension 
of Soviet control over the Eastern European communist parties The result 
was a three-pronged Soviet offensive in the years 1948-1950 aimed at 
consolidating Soviet power over its new empire First, they attempted to 
impose uniformity on, and control over, the Eastern European regimes In 
Yugoslavia the attempt backfired, as Tito successfully resisted Soviet efforts 
and established a system which would continue to confound both the East 
and the West, as we shall note below Elsewhere, local party officials were 
purged for alleged political deviations and by 1950, leaders were in power who 
owed their very existence to Stalin
The second element of Stalin s program was the establishment of 
centralized ideological dominance of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (CPSU) over other communist parties This objective, which was 
closely related to the first, was accomplished through the creation of the 
Commform and the imposition on all parties of the Soviet interpretation of 
"socialist internationalism " In effect, the interests of the CPSU and the USSR
8and the ideological interpretations of the CPSU were declared to be the 
interests and interpretations of the entire communist movement
The third aspect of Stalin s initiative was his decision to test the West s 
commitment to the positions that it held in central Europe Specifically, 
beginning on 24 June 1948, the Soviets closed all access to Berlin resulting in 
the first major potential military confrontation between the superpowers in 
the postwar era During the ensuing eleven months, until the lifting of the 
blockade on 5 May 1949, the level of hostilities between the two superpowers 
was probably the highest during the entire postwar period [with the exception 
of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962] Yet, despite the Soviet attempt to coerce 
the West into withdrawing from Berlin and despite initial US consideration 
of using military power to force their way through to Berlin, the crisis was 
characterized by efforts on both sides to manage the level of confrontation10 
Neither side was willing to push so far as to make a military confrontation 
inevitable For example, the Western decision to supply West Berlin by an 
airlift and the Soviet response not directly to challenge that airlift reduced the 
likelihood of direct military confrontation Moreover, throughout the crisis 
regular political consultations and negotiations among the four occupation 
powers occurred, though until spring 1949 they made virtually no headway
Despite the high level of tension associated with the Berlin Blockade, 
once the West decided to stay and challenge the blockade by an airlift rather 
than by direct military action, a stalemate ensued Behavior on both sides was 
regularized Key Western participants m the events, including Mayor Ernst 
Reuter and General Lucius Clay, were convinced that the Soviets did not 
want war and thus, avoided measures which the Western allies would have 
resisted with force11 In other words, despite the high level of tension, both 
superpowers were careful to control their behavior m order to reduce the 
prospects for direct military action Moreover, once the Soviets recognized 
that they would not accomplish their primary objective of forcing the West 
out of Berlin, they were willing to cut their losses and drop the attempt
Simultaneously with the Berlin Blockade, another series of events 
occurred which would prove to be important for the development of the 
postwar security regime in Europe and for the nature of US-Soviet 
competition Stalin s efforts to impose on Yugoslavia the type of dependency 
relationship that had been created elsewhere in Eastern Europe, resulted in a 
major confrontation Ultimately, Yugoslavia was expelled from the 
communist community, with the expectation that pro-Soviet elements in 
Yugoslavia would seize power and replace Tito and his supporters After an 
initial period of foundering, Tito finally opted to turn to the West for 
economic and military support The result was an independent communist 
state, hostile to the USSR and with close political, economic, and security ties 
to the capitalist West The decision of the Truman administration to provide 
support to Yugoslavia initiated a policy of differentiation m which the United
9States saw independent communist states as a positive alternative to those 
dominated by the Soviet Union
However, over the past four decades, Yugoslavia has represented 
something of a dual dilemma for the superpowers While the United States 
supported Yugoslavia s successful attempt to pursue its foreign and security 
objectives independent of Soviet domination, it rejected the Yugoslav model 
of economic and political organization At the same time, the Soviets did not 
fully accept Yugoslav foreign policy autonomy and found the Yugoslav claim 
to represent an alternative economic and political model of communism an 
irritant Over the past forty years, the specifics of Yugoslavia s place in Europe 
may have shifted, yet the essential element of its independence has remained 
stable Though Yugoslav leaders perception of world affairs has often been 
closer to that of the USSR than to that of the West, their ties with the West 
and with developing countries have been viewed as essential to maintaining 
their independence
In the mid-1950s, developments in both Eastern and Western Europe— 
e g , West Germany s entry into NATO, the suppression of riots in Pilsen and 
Poznan, and the Soviet invasion and suppression of Hungary—created 
conflicts that pitted the superpowers against one another Almost 
simultaneously, however, other developments were occurring which 
reduced the overall level of tension, most notably, the Soviet withdrawal 
from the naval base in Porkkalla, Finland, and the signing of the Austrian 
State Treaty in 1955 Both actions contributed to the emergence of an 
increasingly stable Eastern European security regime The second set of 
developments, along with the normalization of relations with Titos 
Yugoslavia, was part of Nikita Khrushchev s effort to gam Western 
acceptance for his policy of peaceful coexistence After Stalin s death the new 
Soviet leadership was convinced of the counterproductive nature of Stalin s 
confrontational approach to the West That policy had stimulated Western 
countermeasures, including the establishment of NATO and Western 
rearmament and eventually, West Germany s entry into the Atlantic 
Alliance In other words, while consolidating Soviet control over its postwar 
Eastern European empire, Stalin had also contributed to Western fears to the 
point that by 1953, the Soviets faced a militarily integrated and progressively 
more powerful Western alliance
In justifying his position in the foreign policy struggle with Molotov, 
Khrushchev later stated that it was "more important to give a widely visible 
clear signal of willingness to negotiate, than to cling to military positions of 
little significance " 12 To reduce tensions and to gam general acceptance of his 
new approach to East-West relations Khrushchev made peace with Tito, 
returned naval facilities acquired from Finland in 1945, permitted Finland to 
join the Nordic Council, and invited German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer 
to Moscow to negotiate a normalization of relations with West Germany It
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was within this context that the Soviets also agreed to withdraw from Austria 
as part of the postwar settlement in Europe Though the agreement meant 
that Soviet troops would pull back m central Europe, it also required the 
United States to give up its original goal of integrating Austria into the 
Western alliance system Though there is some evidence that the Soviets 
had earlier hoped that the settlement m Austria might be viewed as a model 
for the solution of the Germany question, by the time of its signing, West 
German entry into NATO was virtually assured13
Another important element of the emerging European security regime 
was the initial resolution of the German question through the long-term 
division of Germany, and of Europe, into roughly balanced regions each tied 
closely to one of the superpowers 14 It has been this regime which, for the past 
thirty-five years or so, has provided Europe with a high degree of political and 
security stability—though the regime was not fully in place in 1955—and has 
also undergone some serious crises during the ensuing years
Despite the partial normalization of US-Soviet relations associated 
with these developments, other events in central Eastern Europe m the mid- 
1950s exacerbated tensions in relations between the two superpowers The 
riots m Pilsen and East Berlin in June 1953, and m Poznan in June 1956, were 
suppressed by the Soviets or their allies In part because of the brief duration 
of these events, the Western response was limited to strong criticism of the 
communists for their brutal treatment of legitimate political dissent
It was in the Polish and Hungarian crises of fall 1956 that the greatest 
possibility developed for a US-Soviet confrontation Not only were these 
political crises of longer duration, but m Hungary, full-scale revolution broke 
out followed by the Soviet reoccupation of the country and the military 
suppression of all resistance to the reimposition of Soviet control As we 
have already seen, despite the earlier calls for liberation and the implied 
commitments made in Radio Free Europe broadcasts that Western assistance 
would be forthcoming, the US response was limited to diplomatic 
maneuvering and political condemnation Actual US behavior during the 
Hungarian Revolution was not based on the principles of self-determination 
of peoples or the rolling back of Soviet domination in central Europe Rather, 
it was based on the clear perception of US self-interest specifically, the 
realization that any move to support the Hungarians militarily would likely 
result m a direct military engagement with the USSR and the possible use of 
nuclear weapons Even m the mid-1950s, when the Soviets lacked effective 
delivery systems to target nuclear weapons on US territory, the possibility of a 
nuclear exchange was viewed as a frightening prospect to be avoided at all 
costs
During the Hungarian Crisis, as during all future East-West 
confrontations m central Europe, US leaders effectively recognized Soviet
11
hegemony over this region and avoided challenging that hegemony in ways 
that might have resulted in military confrontation Thus, by 1956 several 
rules of the emerging European security regime—or of superpower behavior 
m central Eastern Europe—had already been codified through practice do 
not challenge the core interests of the other superpower directly, avoid 
intervention in the other superpower s sphere of influence, and do not 
pursue actions likely to result in a direct military confrontation In the case of 
Hungary all of these imperatives were at work First, Hungary was within the 
region viewed by the Soviets as their area of dominance Moreover, US 
intervention in the region would have been perceived in Moscow as a 
challenge to Soviet security and, thus, might very likely have resulted m a 
military clash between the two countries
To a very substantial degree the crises of the past thirty-plus years have 
largely followed the format laid out in Hungary m 1956 Only the Berlin 
Crisis of 1958-61 differed appreciably from this pattern Beginning m 1958 the 
Soviets pursued a policy aimed at consolidation of the political system m the 
GDR and at strengthening the domestic and international legitimacy of its 
client The key issue here was the inability of the GDR to consolidate effective 
control and to gam legitimacy among its populace or in world affairs, given 
the attraction of emigration to West Germany 15 In this sense then, the crisis 
that erupted in August 1961 was the result of one superpowers attempt to 
consolidate control which, however, also challenged the position of the other 
in central Europe From November 1958 until summer 1961, the Soviets 
interspersed demands for the West to recognize the GDR s control over access 
routes to West Berlin with periods of willingness to negotiate a resolution of 
outstanding differences The key issue, from the Soviet and GDR perspective, 
related to the problems that West Berlin posed for the viability of the East 
German state As the GDR moved to finalize the process of collectivizing 
agriculture and of establishing a communist economy m the late 1950s, the 
number of refugees fleeing the country rose dramatically—to more than 
70,000 during the first four months of 1961
The problem for the Soviets was to find a policy which, while closing 
off access to the West, would not result in military confrontation The 
decision to construct the Wall provided precisely such a policy Despite the 
dramatic increase in the immediate level of tension—especially at the local 
level—it was clear that the West was not about to initiate actions that would 
challenge the USSR militarily, and thus, run the risk of nuclear 
confrontation According to Theodore Sorensen, a member of President 
Kennedy s "inner circle, no responsible official m the United States, West 
Berlin, or West Germany recommended the use of force to tear down the 
w all16 Thus, the outcome of the Berlin Crisis reinforces the points made 
above concerning the emergence of a European security regime and the rules 
of that regime Though the Soviets did challenge the status quo m Berlin, 
that challenge never involved the threat of the use of force against the West
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When the decision was finally made to solve the GDR s legitimacy and 
viability problems by sealing it off from the western zone of Berlin, neither of 
the superpowers was willing to risk direct confrontation As events m 
Hungary five years earlier had demonstrated, the United States was unable to 
force the USSR to change its policies in areas considered of vital importance 
to the latter
The next set of events in central Eastern Europe of direct relevance to 
superpower security relations were those surrounding the 1968 reform 
movement m Czechoslovakia and the eventual military intervention in that 
country by the USSR and several of its allies17 Though the West was 
encouraged by the reforms and committed itself to supporting them 
politically and economically, it was unwilling and unable to do more than 
that when the Soviet leadership decided that the evolution of events in 
Czechoslovakia represented a challenge to core Soviet interests Throughout 
summer 1968, as the Soviets made their growing concerns increasingly clear, 
the Western response was limited almost exclusively to warnings of the 
negative implications of Soviet intervention for the emerging detente in 
East-West relations
In many respects the negative effects of the invasion on relations 
within the Commumst movement were more lasting than those on East- 
West relations Already, by spring 1969, the momentum of detente had 
resumed As we shall see below, the period 1969 to 1975 was one of great 
importance for stabilizing the postwar European security regime During 
these six years, most of the "rules" of superpower behavior that had emerged 
on an ad hoc basis since the late 1940s were formally codified in a series of 
agreements that culminated in the Helsinki Accords The beginning of the 
1970s witnessed a whole series of bilateral and multilateral negotiations— 
between West Germany and, respectively, the USSR, Poland, and the GDR 
concerning their mutual bilateral relations, among the four powers 
administering Berlin concerning the status of West Berlin, between the USSR 
and the Umted States concerning nuclear weapons, and among the thirty-five 
states which eventually signed the Helsinki Accords—concerning a broad 
range of issues Out of these formal negotiations emerged agreement on the 
postwar boundaries of east-central Europe and the dominant position of the 
USSR m that region However, agreement was also reached on issues , 
relating to expanding East-West contacts, human rights guarantees in Eastern 
Europe and related issues
A final series of problems faced by the Soviet Umon that affected its 
relations with the United States concerned domestic political instability m 
Poland In spring 1968, for example, student demonstrations against the 
increasingly repressive policies of the regime of Wladyslaw Gomulka resulted 
m harsh repression In December 1970, strikes and worker s demonstrations 
in the major industrial cities along the Baltic Sea were initially crushed by the
13
regime However, this brought down the Gomulka leadership which was 
replaced by that of Eduard Gierek, who committed himself to reforms and 
economic modernization that were meant to solve Poland s endemic 
problems Less than six years later, in June 1976, Gierek was faced with 
similar widespread labor disruption, as he attempted to raise prices of basic 
foodstuffs as part of a policy of economic retrenchment
These domestic disturbances were short-lived and did not impact 
significantly on US-Soviet relations Not until 1980-81, with the emergence 
of the major challenge to the Polish commumst party mounted by Solidarity 
and the growing Soviet concern about a possible repeat of events m 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, did Polish developments become an important 
component of US-Soviet relations 18 Throughout the entire Solidarity period, 
the United States warned the Soviet leadership of the negative implications 
for bilateral relations of direct Soviet intervention m Polish affairs The 
imposition of martial law and the outlawing of Solidarity in December 1981 
did not involve Soviet military forces, however, convinced of direct Soviet 
involvement in the decisions of the government of General Wocjiech 
Jaruzelski, the Reagan Administration imposed political and economic 
sanctions against both the Soviet Union and Poland
The growing hostility m US-Soviet relations associated with events m 
Poland, however, must be understood within the broader context of 
deteriorating superpower relations Already in the mid-1970s, there were 
those in the United States who questioned the wisdom of a policy of detente 
In their view, detente had provided the Soviets with the cover to expand 
their influence within the Third World and to continue their unilateral 
military buildup m both the conventional and nuclear arenas Even prior to 
the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan m December 1979 and the 
imposition by President Carter of the gram embargo, the SALT II treaty was m 
danger of not being ratified by the US Senate The election of Ronald Reagan 
in November 1980 brought to the White House a new political leadership 
convinced of the growing challenge to US interests emanating from "the evil 
empire" and committed to reestablishing US military might and challenging 
the Soviet Union wherever possible Thus, by December 1981, when General 
Jaruzelski imposed martial law in Poland, superpower relations had already 
deteriorated substantially toward what some analysts were calling "Cold War
n "
Yet, despite the growing tension in US-Soviet relations, there was no 
question in 1981 of the possible use of US military force In central Eastern 
Europe, this rule had long since been clarified Despite unhappiness with 
events in Poland and conviction of the direct involvement of Moscow m 
those events, the Reagan administration never considered anything more 
than political and economic sanctions as an indication to the Soviets of the
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level of US indignation and as an "inducement" to both the Soviet and 
Polish leaderships to modify their policies
The final example of conflicting interests between the superpowers as 
they relate to Eastern Europe—though the issue was really one of broader 
European interests—concerned the Soviet introduction, beginning in 1977, of 
SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear missiles targeted on Western Europe In a 
very real way, the deployment of these missiles threatened a possible shift in 
the overall military balance in Europe and thus, a partial challenge to the 
security regime that had been in place for more than a decade The 
introduction of Soviet missiles in the late 1970s and the NATO dual-track 
response of matching the development and deployment of medium-range 
missiles while simultaneously trying to negotiate their elimination, 
contributed significantly to the deterioration of US-Soviet relations in the 
early 1980s Only after a complete breakdown in superpower negotiations on 
arms control, much political posturing on the part of both superpowers, and 
the emergence of a new political leadership with a new foreign policy and 
arms control agenda, was the issue resolved in the breakthrough 
Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty 
agreement of 1987 that called for the removal of all Soviet and US 
intermediate-range missiles However, the Soviet decision to deploy this 
weapons system represented a challenge to the existing security regime in 
Europe Despite Soviet claims that they were merely modernizing older 
weapons systems, both the qualitative improvements of the systems and the 
numbers of systems being deployed represented a major shift m theater 
nuclear capabilities
Although the SS-20s have now been removed, the repercussions of 
this challenge remain The INF treaty and the ongoing unilateral withdrawal 
of some of Soviet ground forces, including tanks, from Central Europe have 
encouraged widespread calls within NATO for fundamental reconsideration 
of the entire security strategy upon which NATO has been based for the past 
thirty-five years
As should be evident at this pomt, despite US rhetoric and stated long­
term objectives, American presidential administrations from Truman to 
Reagan recognized the reality of superpower interests and capabilities m 
central Eastern Europe As a result, they pursued policies vis-à-vis the USSR 
that were part of an overall policy of competitive coexistence Although the 
long-term objective of eliminating Soviet domination over Eastern Europe 
remained, it was tempered by the primary concern of not provoking a 
military confrontation with the Soviet Union Thus, coexistence generally 
won out over the elements of competition in US policy in Eastern Europe 
As noted above, US policy-makers pursued more limited objectives As John 
Gaddis put it when speaking about the policy of the Eisenhower 
administration toward the Soviet Union "since surrender was unthinkable,
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military victory impossible, and the cost of containment unacceptable, it 
seemed logical to explore possibilities for incorporating Soviet-Amencan 
rivalry—which was certain to continue—within a mutually acceptable 
framework of coexistence " 19
By the 1960s and 1970s, the United States expressed the competitive 
elements of the relationship by efforts to encourage the peaceful 
transformation of the Soviet bloc into a more diversified and pluralistic 
entity—i e by a policy of "peaceful engagement " In line with this objective, 
the United States granted most-favored nation status to several countries 
deemed to be pursuing independent policies On a visit during the early years 
of his administration, President Carter praised Poland for its "enlightened" 
policies, the United States returned the crown of St Stephen, the symbol of 
Hungarian statehood, to the government in Budapest, while also granting 
most-favored-nation status to Hungary, and at the Helsinki follow-up 
conference m Belgrade m 1978, Washington took a strong stand on the issue 
of human rights in Eastern Europe
The revolutionary developments of 1989 and early 1990 have already 
restructured the domestic socio-political systems of the countries of the region 
and also the European security system that has been in place since World War 
II Only four times during the past two centuries have events of such 
importance for the nature of domestic and international political 
relationships occurred m Europe 1) during the French Revolution and the 
Napoleonic period when France attempted to destroy the old political order 
and replace it with a French-centered system of nominally independent and 
democratic states 2) after the defeat of Napoleon m 1815, when the old order 
was in part reestablished by the victors, 3) after World War I and the collapse 
of the traditional Central and Eastern European empires and their 
replacement by a number of small states in Central Europe and a regime m 
Soviet Russia committed to revolutionary change, and 4) after World War II 
when the geographic and political map of Europe was modified once more by 
the collapse of the traditional great powers and the emergence of the USSR 
and the United States as the dominant actors in Europe and the world
The changes initiated in 1989 promise to have long-term consequences 
comparable to those associated with the four earlier periods of revolutionary 
restructuring Though the calls in Eastern Europe for the withdrawal of 
Soviet forces and the demands for German reunification, challenge the 
foundations of the existing European security system to this point at least, it 
appears that the leadership m Washington and Moscow are committed to 
ensuring that the changes do not lead to confrontation
Thus, it was in Europe first—and particularly m central Eastern 
Europe—that the two superpowers reached a form of accommodation which 
has permitted them to compete, while simultaneously limiting the extent of
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that competition lest it lead to military confrontation and, ultimately, to 
mutual destruction It is also m central Eastern Europe that the Cold War is 
coming to a close
The Postwar European Security Regime 
and the "'Rules" of Superpower Behavior
After this examination of the nature of Soviet and US interests m Eastern 
Europe and of the evolution of postwar political and security developments 
there as they have concerned relations between the Soviet Union and the 
United States, we turn to a more systematic discussion of the nature of the 
security regime that emerged and of the general rules of behavior associated 
with that regime We begin by emphasizing a point which, though central to 
the entire US-Soviet relationship m Europe and globally, has not yet been 
discussed directly in this chapter—namely, the centrality of nuclear weapons 
and the nuclear stalemate in that relationship The development of nuclear 
weapons and effective delivery systems by the superpowers created an 
environment in which both countries were concerned lest conflicts escalate to 
nuclear confrontation and thus, the possibility of mutual annihilation It has 
been precisely within the context of this nuclear stalemate that East-West and 
Soviet-US relationships have evolved in Europe
Probably the most important security-related development for Europe 
that derived directly from this stalemate and the resulting commitment of 
both the United States and the Soviet Union to prevent confrontation, was 
the evolution of a stable security regime m Europe m which warfare—or 
even the threat of warfare—had been eliminated However, at the same 
time, the participants in this security regime—especially the two major 
military powers—committed large amounts of resources to their security 
systems and maintained large forces In part as a result of the stabilization of 
the security regime in Europe, but also resulting from the increased 
importance of other regions of the world such as the Middle East and Eastern 
Asia, Eastern Europe became relatively less important in the Soviet- 
American global competition and m international affairs generally On the 
other hand, to an increasing degree until the growing economic problems of 
the 1980s, Eastern European countries played a supporting role m the 
expansion of Soviet involvement throughout the Third World Military, 
economic, and political activities of individual Eastern European countries— 
along with Cuba—often facilitated the expanded activities of the USSR 
and/or helped to distribute the Soviet costs of empire 20
Ever since the Second World War, Eastern Europe has been an area 
viewed as essential to the vital interests of one of the two superpowers, while 
the other s interests were more marginal In a very real sense until the 
revolutionary changes of 1989, Eastern Europe was viewed by the Soviets as a
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"hard sphere of influence" in which they had important interests and over 
which they are able to exercise extensive control21 Although at one level the 
United States refused to accept the idea of permanent Soviet dominance over 
the area, in other ways it admitted that in times of crisis when the Soviet 
leadership saw a serious challenge to its interests in the area there was little 
that the Umted States could do to influence Soviet policy Given the 
conventional military balance m the region and the implications of a global 
nuclear confrontation, American presidents since Truman have excluded the 
use of military power Thus, the security regime that emerged in Europe was 
one based on the reality of the dominant role of the USSR in Eastern 
Europe 22
In fact, during the the early 1970s the detente policy of Henry Kissinger 
was to a very great degree based on accepting the reality of Soviet dominance 
in Eastern Europe as a part of the cost involved in "taming" Soviet behavior 
throughout the rest of die world This viewpoint was expressed perhaps 
most boldly in the so-called Sonnenfeldt Doctrine of 1975 that referred to the 
' organic nature of the Soviet-Eastern European relationship and seemingly 
accepted long-standing Soviet domination in Eastern Europe However, this 
viewpoint incorrectly assumed that the imperial relationship between the 
USSR and Eastern Europe and the existence of political regimes viewed by the 
majority of the population as illegitimate, could remain stable over time 23 In 
fact, as we shall discuss in some detail below, at the very time when US policy 
accepted the stability of the status quo in the area, pressures were beginning to 
build up that a decade later would result m revolutionary change Among 
these were the growing evidence of economic deterioration that would 
reduce the ability of the regimes to fulfill commitments for improved 
standards of living, the festering of popular resentment of continued Soviet 
domination, and the ongoing suppression of open political expression
As we have already seen, throughout the past four decades there have 
been few actual confrontations between the USSR and the United States that 
had their origin m Eastern European events Only during the Berlin 
Blockade of 1948-49—when the nature of the postwar European security 
system was still in flux—was there a significant possibility of direct military 
confrontation But even m Berlin, the two sides soon worked out tacit 
arrangements short of the use of military force according to which the 
remaining months of the struggle over the status of Berlin would be 
conducted By the mid-1950s—and even more clearly after the Berlin Wall 
crisis of 1961—the general outlines of the new European system had emerged 
in which the continent and Germany were divided into separate political- 
economic-military blocs NATO and Warsaw Pact military forces have 
precluded each other s ability to make a military breakthrough Moreover, 
the central role of the superpowers in this balance means that their global 
strategic nuclear capabilities are also integrally tied to the balance m Europe
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Out of this situation arose a pattern of expectations and controlled 
responses that contributed to the overall security stability of Europe, despite 
periodic challenges that have emerged, primarily from the challenges to the 
Soviets control of their own bloc This pattern of expectations and behaviors 
included several clear 'rules of prudence ' Seweryn Bialer and Alexander 
George provide listings of rules of prudence in conflict situations that have 
evolved over time to guide superpower relations 24 But these rules depended 
on a cold war regime that was of mutual interest What no one foresaw, was 
the eventual judgement of the Soviet leadership under Gorbachev that the 
cold war regime no longer serves its interests
In the crisis situations that we have discussed, we find the type of 
behavior meant to limit conflict precisely because of the fear of escalation to 
the nuclear level Though not all of the general "rules" are directly relevant 
to US-Soviet competitive relations in Eastern Europe, those which are 
relevant have been observed virtually without fail In all of the cases of 
actual or threatened Soviet intervention to reimpose control over recalcitrant 
allies—Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland—the US publicly stated its 
intention not to intervene Recently, though there has been no evidence of 
Soviet intentions to intervene m the area to maintain its dominant position, 
the US officials have announced that the United States will not attempt to 
take unilateral advantage of the revolutionary changes that are redefining the 
nature of politics and security in Eastern Europe 25
In line with the ' rule" of caution in pursuing policies in areas where 
the vital interests of the other power are at stake, Western policy-makers 
have been especially careful in developing relations with the Eastern 
European countries One important deviation from this caution was the first 
stage of West Germany s "Ostpolitik initiated m 1966 by the Kissmger-Brandt 
Grand Coalition The policy explicitly aimed at establishing direct relations 
between Bonn and the Eastern European capitals and, in part at least, weaning 
the latter away from their close dependency on the USSR, splitting the 
Warsaw Pact, and isolating the GDR As a corollary of their military 
intervention in Czechoslovakia m 1968, the Soviets made clear the level of 
their opposition to this type of "interference" in their sphere of influence In 
the new version of "Ostpolitik initiated m 1969 the Brandt government, in 
effect, cleared matters with Moscow prior to initiating efforts to expand 
relations m Eastern Europe
Another exception to this rule occurred m 1981 in Poland as US and 
Western labor unions, and other interest groups, actively supported the 
Solidarity movement One of the major accusations brought by the Soviets 
agamst Solidarity was precisely the charge that it was functioning as an agent 
of Western interests The imposition of martial law in December 1981 
reduced these "illicit" political contacts, though the Jaruzelski regime was 
never able to eliminate them entirely
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Throughout the entire postwar period, negotiations and less formal 
political contacts have occurred during periods of heightened tension For 
example, during the Berlin Blockade in 1948-49, regular consultations 
occurred between the Soviets and the three major Western governments
The "rules of prudence" m US-Soviet behavior concerning Eastern 
Europe resulted initially primarily from past behavior patterns and consisted 
of a kind of "common law" m US-Soviet relations During the detente period 
of 1970-75, however, a substantial number of these rules were "codified" in a 
series of formal agreements The treaties that emerged from bilateral and 
multilateral negotiations resulted in the formal recognition of existing 
postwar borders, commitments not to support change m the territorial status 
quo through coercive means, specific agreements concerning the status of 
West Berlin, and agreements on non-interference in the internal affairs of 
other states Though it was never operationalized and was later the source of 
bitter criticism, the "Basic Principles Agreement" on US-Soviet relations 
signed by President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev in 1972 also 
contributed to the environment of formalizing the rules of behavior in US- 
Soviet relations 26
As US-Soviet agreement and cooperation was formalized, it also 
became more complex For example, in the negotiations over the status of 
West Berlin, both sides came to the negotiating table with a specific list of 
objectives For the West, this was a list of rather limited goals of "practical 
improvements" in the situation in and around Berlin For the Soviet Union 
the key objective was Western recognition of the GDR However, both sides 
had additional objectives, the attainment of which the successful negotiations 
over Berlin might facilitate For example, the Soviets recognized that they 
could not achieve the general objective of detente, nor the more specific 
objectives of Western recognition of the GDR and full Western participation 
in a conference on security and cooperation in Europe, unless the Berlin 
situation were improved Thus, the negotiations were based on bargaining 
strategies that cut across different issue areas The final agreement on the 
status of Berlin did not meet the long-term objectives or ambitions of either 
side, rather it was a compromise in which both accepted what they were able 
to get at the time 27
Before turning to a concluding discussion of the importance of the 
dramatic recent changes in the USSR and Eastern Europe and their relevance 
for increased East-West and Soviet-US cooperation in relationship to Eastern 
Europe, it is well to summarize briefly the argument of this chapter on this 
point By the mid-1950s—definitely by the early 1960s—a new security regime 
had emerged in Europe that included the division of the continent into 
conflicting military blocs In addition, given the level of Soviet interest and 
involvement in Eastern Europe, the military balance in the area, and the
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implications of the superpower nuclear stalemate, rules of behavior emerged 
which resulted in careful and limited Western involvement in the region of 
a type that would not lead to superpower confrontation By the 1970s, this 
regime was largely formalized through a series of agreements that culminated 
in the Helsinki Accords of 1975 Though both superpowers have considered 
challenging the foundations of this security regime—the Soviets, marginally, 
by the deployment of SS-20s m the late 1970s and the United States, more 
centrally, through the effort embodied in President Reagan s campaign of 
military revitalization, including SDI, to shift the very nature of the global 
superpower military balance—it remained m place m 1985 when Mikhail 
Gorbachev took office In the final section of this chapter we shall discuss the 
implications of Gorbachev s "new thinking' and the revolutionary events of 
1989-90 in Eastern Europe for expanding the cooperative aspects of Soviet-US 
relations in the region
The East European Revolution and 
Expanded Superpower Cooperation
Since 1985 when Mikhail Gorbachev assumed the leadership of the 
Communist Party in the Soviet Union—and even more since spring of 
1989—revolutionary changes have occurred within Eastern Europe which are 
fundamentally transforming the European security system and the 
competitive-cooperative relationship between the two superpowers At the 
beginning of 1989 Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev found only limited 
support among the communist political elites of Eastern Europe for his 
conception of political reform Only the communist party leaderships m 
Poland and Hungary could be viewed as committed reformers Elsewhere, 
the concept of reform received mixed reactions little more than lip service in 
Bulgaria, sharp criticism in Czechoslovakia and the GDR, or outright 
condemnation in Romania Even in Poland and Hungary, the pace of reform 
was slow and seemed on the verge of stalling By the end of the year, a 
Solidarity government ruled Poland, the Berlin Wall had fallen and German 
reunification seemed but a matter of time, Ceaucescu s dictatorship had been 
overthrown in a bloody revolution in Romania, a world-renowned dissident 
playwright, Vaclav Havel, had been elected president m Czechoslovakia, and 
the Red Army was on the verge of moving out of much of the region at local 
request Revolutionary change—in the full sense of the term 
' revolutionary"—was in process throughout the region, as the basic 
structures of domestic political power (including the formal institutions of 
governance) as well as the structures of the European inter-state system were 
radically changing
Only four times during the past two centuries have events of such 
importance for the nature of domestic and international political 
relationships occurred in Europe (1) during the French Revolution and the
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Napoleonic wars, when France attempted to destroy the old political order 
and replace it with a French-centered system of nominally democratic, but 
dependent, states, (2) after the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, when the old order 
was in large part reestablished by the victors, (3) after World War I and the 
collapse of the traditional European empires and their replacement by a 
number of small states in Central Europe and a regime in Soviet Russia 
committed to revolutionary change, and (4) after World War II when the 
geographic and political map of Europe was changed once more by the 
collapse of traditional European states and the emergence of the USSR and 
the United States as the dominant actors in Europe and the world The 
changes initiated during 1989 promise to have consequences comparable to 
those associated with the four earlier periods of revolutionary 
"restructuring "
Though the economic and political tensions of forty years of Soviet 
domination, autocratic rule by local communist elites, and economic 
mismanagement and corruption had become increasingly apparent 
throughout Eastern Europe, little overt evidence was visible m early 1989 that 
events of such import were about to occur—though social pressures were 
building that would explode later in the year Central to the dramatic changes 
throughout the region that resulted m the end of the Cold War and m the 
establishment of Eastern Europe s first non-communist governments since 
the 1940s, was the new attitude of the Gorbachev leadership toward the area 
In the past, any movement toward reform met with strong Soviet resistance 
By 1989, Soviet policy had shifted to the point where it encouraged reform 
and was even willing to accept the reality of expanded pluralism and the 
demise of commumst dictatorships as the price for economic efficiency and 
political stability in the region and enhanced long-term stable political and 
economic relationships with the West28
Yet, the radical changes that occurred m Eastern Europe after spring 
1989, must be viewed within the overall framework of state socialism as it 
had been institutionalized in the area and of the recent emergence of 
autonomous social groups demanding an end to communist party 
dominance and a recognition of the rights and interests of "the people " As 
developed m the Soviet Union in the 1930s under Stalin, and in Eastern 
Europe after its imposition m the late 1940s, state socialism consisted of a 
highly centralized economy that emphasized heavy industry, authoritarian 
political structures meant to ensure political control by miniscule and 
illegitimate commumst party elites, and a strong dependency or patron-client 
relationship between the USSR and the smaller communist states of Eastern 
Europe However, almost immediately after Stalin s death in 1953 and 
throughout the ensmng years evidence mounted that demonstrated both the 
political and the economic weaknesses of the system Sporadically, though 
generally unsuccessfully until 1989, attempts were made in some of the
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various countries concerned, to reform portions of the state socialist system 
inherited from Stalin
After the signing of the Helsinki Accords of 1975, organized 
movements committed to the protection of political and human rights were 
active (and under great pressure) m a number of European communist 
states—Committee for Worker s Defense (KOR) in Poland, Charter 77 m 
Czechoslovakia, and Helsinki Watch groups throughout the region Usually 
these groups based their demands for political reform on the commitments 
made by their governments in Helsinki and on the guarantees of the 
constitutions of their respective states
Evidence also mounted throughout much of the region concerning the 
stagnation of economic growth and the fact that the socialist economies were 
falling even further behind their capitalist counterparts, including those of 
the East Asian Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs), m the development 
and adaptation of modern technology to the production process In addition, 
the inability of the state to meet implied social commitments—i e , the 
growing shortages of consumer goods and housing, the inability to halt the 
degradation of the environment, and related problems—contributed to 
increased dissatisfaction with the existing political system and to the demand 
for major political change that would extend effective participation beyond 
the narrow circle of the communist party elite These attitudes were 
strengthened by the growing awareness of the success of capitalist Europe m 
improving living standards
Even before the emergence to political prominence of Mikhail 
Gorbachev and "new thinking" in the USSR, evidence existed of a growing 
awareness of the fundamental nature of the problems facing communist 
states, the imperatives (and perils) of initiating economic and political 
reform, and the necessity of expanding flexibility in relations between the 
USSR and its European allies Thus, prior to spring 1985 when Gorbachev 
was elected the new head of the CPSU the situation throughout much of the 
region was ripe for political change However, only since 1985 have the 
efforts at reform expanded to the point where one can speak of the 
dismantling of key elements of the traditional state socialist system—from 
the dominance of central planning to the emergence of officially sanctioned 
pluralism and the decline of the dominant role of the communist 
nomenklatura
Since the Gorbachev reform effort is so very central to the 
revolutionary changes that have occurred in Eastern Europe, it is important 
briefly to outline its most prominent contours It is essential to recall that, 
when Gorbachev arrived on the scene in 1985, the Soviet Union was already 
in the throes of a major crisis In the economic realm Soviet Gross National 
Product (GNP) had stagnated—according to key economic advisor Abel
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Aganbegyan, real growth ceased by the mid-1970s Politically, the population 
gave evidence of increasing levels of ennui and withdrawal, alcoholism and 
incompetent medical care resulted in reduced life expectancy, especially 
among males, and in higher infant mortality rates 29 Soviet allies m Eastern 
Europe were suffering from similar problems and had become a growing 
dram on the Soviet economy, clients in the Third World had proven 
incapable of establishing stable functioning political or economic systems and 
contributed to the growing "costs of empire" for the Soviet state, the 
exponential growth of Soviet military capabilities had occurred at the expense 
of other portions of the economy, and many of the assumptions that had 
undergirded Soviet foreign policy during the Brezhnev years had proven to 
be false
It was m this environment that Gorbachev proposed dramatic reforms 
as a means to rejuvenate the Soviet economic and political system In effect, 
the initial Gorbachev message can be summarized as follows the Soviet 
Union finds itself in an economic and political crisis situation that 
undermines its ability to provide basic goods and services to its population 
and threatens to erode its position as a global power To deal with this 
problem, revolutionary changes are required within the economy—including 
decentralization of decision-making, the establishment of competition within 
the system, the emergence of elements of a market economy, and related 
changes of a comparably revolutionary character within the context of the 
Soviet economy Increased efficiency, enhanced quality, and the reduction of 
the technological gap with the West are among the central objectives of the 
economic reform
Such reforms, however, will inevitably confront opposition within the 
party-state bureaucracy which benefits greatly from the perquisites associated 
with the present system To overcome this opposition, glasnost (or openness) 
and democratization will create an alliance between the reform-mmded 
leadership and the masses of the population aimed at exposing the 
corruption, incompetence, and inefficiencies of the current system and, thus, 
contributing to the success of the reform effort Initially, therefore, glasnost 
and democratization were viewed m rather narrow, instrumental terms as 
the means to facilitate the introduction of radical economic reforms
There also existed the realization among many of the reformers that 
the centralization of political power and the absence of political participation 
and, thus, political responsibility, had been key elements in explaining the 
failure of the Stalinist system These attitudes contributed to the view that 
the entire reform movement also included an important political component 
that would open access to political decision-making to ever broader segments 
of the population On the negative side, from their perspective, the reform 
leadership underestimated the degree to which glasnost and democratization 
would develop a life of their own, as the political agendas of the minority
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populations—Lithuanians, Armenians, Uzbeks, and others—emerged 
differently from the agenda of the reformers in Moscow Yet, this 
development goes beyond the context of our current discussion, except as it 
relates to the growing pressures for political change that have impinged upon 
Gorbachev and his supporters
Thus, perestroika, openness and democratization, have been 
intimately interrelated ever since the beginning of the Gorbachev reform 
program Moreover, "new thinking" and new behavior in the foreign policy 
have also been an integral part of the Gorbachev reforms First, the nature, 
scope, and cost of domestic reform would require an international 
environment m which the Soviet leadership was not concerned with a new 
cold war or arms race and would be able to devote more of its attention to the 
issues associated with reform Moreover, the costs of Soviet foreign policy 
would have to be reduced dramatically, given the expanded investment 
demands of a successful revitalization of the economy Since the past 
commitment of extensive resources to allies and clients in Eastern Europe 
and the Third World, had not resulted in politically stable and economically 
productive states, those commitments would have to be reconsidered and in 
many cases reduced Since the expansion of Soviet military capabilities and 
the building of bigger and better weapons systems had not resulted in 
expanded security, efforts to achieve security through accommodation and 
assurance strategies toward the West and, thus, to reduce the military burden, 
would also be essential
Soviet policy since 1985 has undergone more than than mere rhetorical 
change The dramatic shift in position on a number of key issues concerning 
nuclear weapons and arms control by the Gorbachev leadership was essential 
to the agreement to scrap all intermediate-range nuclear weapons m Europe 
and Asia The announcement m December 1988 that the USSR would 
unilaterally reduce its military strength in central Europe by 50,000 troops and 
upwards of 1,000 tanks—and the ongoing implementation of the first stage of 
that withdrawal, represented yet another shift m Soviet security policy These 
moves were apparently meant to accomplish several important objectives 
First, they indicated to the West that "new thinking" in the foreign and 
security policy areas was more than rhetoric, that it presaged a dramatic shift 
m the way m which the USSR would deal with the outside world, m 
particular, with the countries of Europe Secondly, they were meant to 
encourage the West to enter into a mutual process of arms reduction A third 
objective concerned the hope that arms reductions, especially in the 
conventional area, would eventually bring with them the economic savings 
required if the domestic program of economic restructuring and reform m the 
Soviet Union was to succeed
An important component of Gorbachev s foreign policy initiatives has 
concerned bilateral relations with the countries of Eastern Europe Since at
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least 1987, Gorbachev s response to the growing economic and political 
problems of the region, as well as to the erosion of unity and cohesion within 
the socialist community, was to call upon the leaderships of the Eastern 
European countries to reform their own political and economic systems 
Unlike past Soviet leaders, Gorbachev argued that, ultimately, the decision on 
reform—as other major decisions—must be made by the Eastern Europeans 
themselves Moscow no longer viewed itself as the final arbiter of ideological 
orthodoxy for its Eastern European allies, according to the new interpretation 
of socialist internationalism, an interpretation verified by Soviet reactions to 
the revolutionary events of 1989 High-level Soviet officials have stated that 
the USSR was wrong to intervene militarily in Czechoslovakia in 1968, non- 
communist governments in Poland and elsewhere have been accepted as 
partners within the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and Gorbachev himself 
virtually renounced past Soviet policies in statements made during his visits 
to Strasbourg and Helsinki in August and October of 1989 Even the 
integration of its key Eastern European ally, the German Democratic Republic, 
into a reunited Germany, has been accepted in principle
Initially, it appears that Gorbachev hoped that East European 
communists could reform their economies and their political systems in a 
manner to make them viable and productive However, given the failure of 
Eastern European communists to accomplish this task and the revolutionary 
changes that have brought non-communist or coalition governments to 
power throughout the region, he has accepted the idea of an Eastern Europe 
comprised of stable, economically efficient, though non-communist, systems 
as preferable to a continuation of the status quo of the 1980s The effort to 
maintain politically illegitimate and economically inefficient regimes in 
Eastern Europe by force or threat of force has been abandoned in the hope that 
mutually beneficial relationships can emerge in the future between the 
Soviet Union and Europe s dominant economic power, Germany, and a 
revitalized set of "Fmland-like' systems in Eastern Europe
In a way, by agreeing to dismantle its intermediate-range nuclear 
weapons, announcing unilateral cuts m conventional weapons, declaring its 
willingness to engage m wide-ranging negotiations for the reduction of 
strategic nuclear weapons, and accepting the "new order" emerging m Eastern 
Europe as a result of the revolutionary changes of 1989, the Soviets have 
challenged the very existence of the European security regime that has been 
in place for more than thirty years The opportunity now exists of forging 
cross-alliance agreements that is already resulting m a dramatic lowermg of 
the level of overt hostility in US-Soviet and East-West relations and m the 
development of a new European security regime m which the divisions of 
Europe might be appreciably reduced
The dramatic changes that have occurred m the USSR, in Eastern 
Europe, and in East-West relations and have led to a changing European
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international security system, are the result of both the domestic imperatives 
of the communist political systems and the Cold War environment in which 
they developed The Cold War, defined in part as the emergence in Europe of 
a stable security regime that prevented war because of the dangers of 
escalation to nuclear confrontation, was a necessary condition for the recent 
revolutionary changes that have occurred m Europe It created an 
international environment in which competition was diverted to areas of 
peripheral concern for both superpowers, though an environment in which 
ever greater amounts of military capabilities were being created and greater 
stress placed on domestic economies
At the same time, however, within both alliance systems, domestic, 
political, and economic developments ran their own course In the West, 
extensive political and economic cooperation contributed to an 
unprecedented expansion of both economic welfare and political 
participation In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the experiment m 
applied Marxism-Leninism proved to be a failure By the 1980s, centralized 
economies could no longer provide adequately for the welfare of their 
populations (especially when compared with the almost unbridled economic 
successes of Western states) and were faced with ever greater demands for real 
political participation In many respects George Kennan s prediction of the 
internal non-viability of the Stalinist political-economic model has proven to 
be accurate 30
As recent developments m both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Umon 
itself imply, a reduction in centralized, authoritarian control within the 
Soviet bloc will not necessarily result in increased local stability Traditional 
conflicts—as those between Magyars and Romanians, Bulgarians and Turks— 
may well increase, as the heavy hand of Soviet control has relaxed However, 
assuming that the West does not attempt to intervene in such conflicts to the 
disadvantage of the USSR, they need not result m expanded superpower 
conflict
The past forty-five years have witnessed a competition for power and 
influence between the Soviet Union and the Umted States which began m 
East-Central Europe and then expanded to cover most of the globe In the 
process of pursuing that conflict, the two countries have expended a 
tremendous amount of effort and capabilities They have contributed to the 
exacerbation of regional conflicts and to the militarization of other societies 
They have also come to the brink of nuclear disaster on occasion, such as 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis They are now faced with the possibility of 
resolving at least some of their outstanding differences and building upon the 
stability of the relationships that have existed in Europe Serious common 
problems face both countries—from the threats of nuclear destruction and 
environmental degradation to the security dangers that might emerge from 
the unrequited demands of some of the less developed countries Efforts to
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solve these and other problems may also contribute to an enhanced level of 
cooperation in the narrower, or co-valuational, sense of the term
In sum, we currently live in a period when dramatic changes in US- 
Soviet relations are possible Cooperation, in the sense of agreements based 
on shared values, seems more feasible now than it has been in the past This 
does not mean that the two major global powers will not continue to compete 
and that their objectives will not come into conflict with one another What 
it does mean is the possibility, especially in Europe, of expanding the arena m 
which their interests coincide
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